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Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme 
Court’s Sudden Expansion of 
Conspiracy Liability (And Why 
Bribe-Taking Foreign Officials Should 
Take Note) 
Michael F. Dearington* 
Abstract 
Last year, the United States Supreme Court decided a Hobbs 
Act conspiracy case that could significantly expand the bounds of 
the general federal conspiracy statute. In Ocasio v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016), the Court held that, under “age-old 
principles of conspiracy law,” a police officer could conspire with 
shop owners to extort those very same shop owners in violation of 
the Hobbs Act. The corollary is that a shop owner can, in theory, 
conspire to extort himself. If a shop owner can conspire to extort 
himself as a matter of law, why can’t a bribe-taking foreign 
official conspire to bribe himself in violation of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)? This Article posits that, under 
Ocasio’s flawed holding, and contrary to the oft-cited Fifth Circuit 
decision, United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(per curiam), he probably can.  
                                                                                                     
 *  Michael F. Dearington is an attorney at the Washington, D.C., office of 
Arent Fox LLP, where he focuses his practice on complex civil litigation and 
government investigations. He previously clerked for the Honorable José A. 
Cabranes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and is a 
graduate of Vanderbilt University Law School and Trinity College. The views 
expressed herein are his alone, and the information provided by the author is 
not intended to be legal advice, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship. 
OCASIO V. UNITED STATES 205 
 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ......................................................................... 205 
II. Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court’s Questionable 
Distillation of “Longstanding Principles of Conspiracy Law” ... 206 
A. The Ocasio Decision ........................................................ 207 
B. Did Ocasio Improperly Extend Holte and Gebardi? ...... 214 
III. Corrupt Foreign Officials, Beware: Ocasio’s Potential Impact 
on United States v. Castle and the Scope of FCPA Conspiracy 
Liability ...................................................................................... 220 
A. United States v. Castle ................................................... 221 
B. Is Castle still good law? .................................................. 225 
 
I. Introduction 
Just last year, the United States Supreme Court decided a 
Hobbs Act conspiracy case that could significantly expand the 
bounds of the general federal conspiracy statute.1 Few have taken 
notice. In Ocasio v. United States,2 the Court held that, under 
“age-old principles of conspiracy law,” a police officer could 
conspire with shop owners to extort those very same shop owners 
in violation of the Hobbs Act.3 The corollary is that a shop owner 
can, in theory, conspire to extort himself.4 If a shop owner can 
conspire to extort himself as a matter of law, why can’t a 
bribe-taking foreign official conspire to bribe himself? This Article 
posits that, under Ocasio’s flawed holding, and contrary to the 
                                                                                                     
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 2. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016). 
 3. See id. at 1427 (rejecting the argument that a police officer “cannot be 
convicted of conspiring with . . . shop-owners to obtain money from them under 
the color of official right . . . . because it is contrary to age-old principles of 
conspiracy law”). 
 4. See id. 
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oft-cited Fifth Circuit decision United States v. Castle,5 he 
probably can.  
This Article first analyzes the Ocasio decision and argues 
that the Supreme Court misapplied two early conspiracy-law 
decisions, United States v. Holte6 and Gebardi v. United States,7 
in reaching its anomalous holding in Ocasio.8 The Article then 
turns its focus to a logical extension of Ocasio’s holding: Although 
the Fifth Circuit’s longstanding Castle decision previously 
precluded federal prosecutors from charging bribe-taking foreign 
officials with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (“FCPA”)—leaving them to pursue other, more creative 
charges—Ocasio’s holding casts doubt on Castle and could enable 
prosecutors to charge bribe-taking foreign officials with FCPA 
conspiracy.9     
II. Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court’s 
Questionable Distillation of “Longstanding Principles 
of Conspiracy Law” 
In Ocasio, the Supreme Court held that “[u]nder 
longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be 
convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof 
that he entered into a conspiracy that had as its objective the 
obtaining of property from another conspirator with his consent 
and under color of official right.”10 In other words, a police officer 
can conspire with a shop owner to extort the shop owner; and a 
shop owner can theoretically conspire to extort himself.11 As 
                                                                                                     
 5.  See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835–36 (5th Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam) (declining to “extend the reach of the FCPA through the application of 
the conspiracy statute” to bribe-taking foreign officials). 
 6.  236 U.S. 140 (1915). 
 7.  287 U.S. 112 (1932). 
 8.  Infra Part II. 
 9.  Infra Part III. 
 10.  United States v. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016).  
 11.  See id.; Kate Stith, No Entrenchment: Thomas on the Hobbs Act, the 
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explained in this section, however, the Court based its curious 
holding on two Mann Act cases that turned on the Mann Act’s 
particular legislative history—and that cannot be neatly grafted 
onto a Hobbs Act conspiracy case.        
A. The Ocasio Decision 
The facts of Ocasio are straightforward. Various Baltimore 
police officers participated in a kickback scheme whereby they 
would persuade vehicle owners who were involved in traffic 
accidents to take their damaged vehicles to a particular 
auto-repair shop, and in return the shop owners would pay the 
officers kickbacks for each vehicle they consequently repaired.12 
The petitioner, a former police officer who had been convicted of 
conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, argued that as a matter of 
law he could not have conspired with the shop owners to obtain 
money from them under color of official right—essentially 
because the shop owners could not conspire with the officer to 
extort themselves.13    
Despite the argument’s logical appeal, a divided Supreme 
Court, with Justice Alito writing for the majority, upheld the 
officer’s conspiracy conviction.14 The Court began by examining 
black-letter law interpreting the general federal conspiracy 
statute: “The government does not have to prove that [a] 
defendant intended to commit the underlying offense 
himself/herself,” the Court explained.15 “Instead, ‘[i]f conspirators 
have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the 
                                                                                                     
Ocasio Mess, and the Vagueness Doctrine, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 233, 236 (2017) 
(“To be clear, as strange as it sounds, Ocasio held that a Hobbs Act ‘victim’ can 
‘conspire’ in his own extortion.”).  
 12.  See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1427–28. 
 13.  See id. at 1427 (describing the petitioner’s argument that “as a matter 
of law, he cannot be convicted of conspiring with the shop owners to obtain 
money from them under color of official right”). 
 14.  See id. at 1436 (upholding the petitioner’s conspiracy conviction). 
 15.  Id. at 1429. 
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crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty 
as the perpetrators.’”16 For instance, 
[A] person may conspire to commit burglary without 
agreeing to set foot inside the targeted home. It is 
enough if the conspirator agrees to help the person who 
will actually enter the dwelling, perhaps by serving as a 
lookout or driving the getaway car. Likewise, “[a] specific 
intent to distribute drugs oneself is not required to 
secure a conviction for participating in a drug-trafficking 
conspiracy.”17 
Thus, under Ocasio, a shop owner need not commit a substantive 
Hobbs Act offense as a predicate to a conspiracy charge, so long 
as he conspired with another who would do so.18 This principle 
did not resolve the ultimate question, though, because the shop 
owner was not even capable of obtaining money from himself 
under color of official right; so how could he conspire to do so? The 
Court had an answer to that question, too.  
The Court explained that a person may be convicted of 
conspiracy even if the person is incapable of committing the 
substantive offense himself.19 The Court waded into murkier 
waters to illustrate this point, however, examining two early 
Mann Act cases: United States v. Holte20 and Gebardi v. United 
States.21 Section 2 of the Mann Act essentially provided that it 
was illegal to knowingly cause to be transported a woman or girl 
across state lines “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, 
or for any other immoral purpose.”22 In Holte and Gebardi, the 
                                                                                                     
 16.  Id. at 1429–30 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 
(1997)). 
 17. Id. at 1430 (quoting United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 
1994)). 
 18. Id.   
 19. See id. at 1430 (commenting that a conspirator may be convicted even 
though he is incapable of committing the substantive offense himself). 
 20.  236 U.S. 140 (1915). 
 21.  287 U.S. 112 (1932). 
 22.  White-Slave Traffic Act of 1910 (the “Mann Act”), 61 Cong. Ch. 395, 36 
Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (2012)).   
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Supreme Court addressed whether and when a woman or girl 
could be charged with conspiracy to transport herself across state 
lines for an immoral purpose.23 In both decisions, the Court 
reasoned that “an agreement to commit an offense may be 
criminal, though its purpose is to do what some of the 
conspirators may be free to do alone,”24 and he may also conspire 
to commit a crime that he is incapable of committing himself.25 
The Court in Holte and in Gebardi also noted that the Mann Act 
did not implicate an exception to conspiracy liability that has 
come to be known as Wharton’s Rule26—where “concurrence [is] 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 118–119; Holte, 236 U.S. at 144. 
 24. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 120; see also Holte, 236 U.S. at 144 (“[A] 
conspiracy to accomplish what an individual is free to do may be a crime, and 
even more plainly a person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a 
third person.” (citations omitted)). The Court in Holte relied on Drew v. Thaw, 
235 U.S. 432 (1914), where the Supreme Court denied habeas relief to a 
defendant charged with conspiring with others to secure his escape from a 
mental-health facility, even though the defendant, according to the defense, 
could not be charged with the escape itself. Id. at 440. Whether a defendant can 
be charged with conspiracy, the Drew Court explained, “depends on the statute. 
It is perfectly possible and even may be rational to enact that a conspiracy to 
accomplish what an individual is free to do shall be a crime.” Id. at 438.  
 25.  Holte, 236 U.S. at 144; see Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 120–21 (“Incapacity of 
one to commit the substantive offense does not necessarily imply that he may 
with impunity conspire with others who are able to commit it.”). For instance, “a 
conspiracy with an officer or employee of the government or any other for an 
offense that only he could commit has been held for many years to fall within 
the conspiracy section,” and “a woman may conspire to procure an abortion upon 
herself when under the law she could not commit the substantive crime and 
therefore, it has been held, could not be an accomplice,” even though “there may 
be a degree of cooperation that would not amount to a crime, as where it was 
held that a purchase of spirituous liquor from an unlicensed vendor was not a 
crime in the purchaser although it was in the seller.” Holte, 236 U.S. at 144–45.   
 26. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 782–83 (1975) (“The 
classic Wharton’s Rule offenses—adultery, incest, bigamy, dueling—are crimes 
that are characterized by the general congruence of the agreement and the 
completed substantive offense. . . . and the immediate consequences of the crime 
rest on the parties themselves rather than on society at large.”). In Iannelli, the 
Supreme Court noted that its “most complete description of the [Wharton’s 
Rule] appears in” Gebardi. See id. at 774 n.8. But the Court noted that 
“Wharton’s Rule owes its name to Francis Wharton, whose treatise on criminal 
law identified the doctrine and its fundamental rationale.” Id. at 773. The Court 
in Iannelli added that a third-party exception to the classic Wharton’s Rule 
 
210 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 204 (2017) 
 
 
necessary to effect [the] crime”27—because a woman could be 
transported for an immoral purpose without her consent or 
complicity.28 Holte and Gebardi require further explication to 
understand their relevance to the facts in Ocasio.   
In Holte, in a concise opinion penned by Justice Holmes, the 
Court applied the foregoing principles in holding that a woman 
can in some circumstances be charged with conspiring with a 
man to transport herself across state lines for an immoral 
purpose in violation of the Mann Act.29 The Court first reasoned 
that a woman could in some circumstances commit a substantive 
violation of the Mann Act—“for instance, [where] a professional 
prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was the man, 
should suggest and carry out a journey within the act of 1910 in 
the hope of blackmailing the man, and should buy the railroad 
tickets, or should pay the fare from Jersey City to New York.”30 
                                                                                                     
generally is thought to apply when a third party “ha[s] conspired with the 
principals to encourage commission of the substantive offense.” Id. at 781 n.15. 
“The rationale supporting this exception,” the Court reasoned, “appears to be 
that the addition of a third party enhances the dangers presented by the 
crime . . . [and] the legislature would not have intended to preclude punishment 
for a combination of greater dimension than that required to commit the 
substantive offense.” Id.  
 27.  Holte, 236 U.S. at 145. 
 28. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–22 (describing how “criminal 
transportation under the Mann Act may be effected without the woman’s 
consent”). 
 29. Holte, 236 U.S. at 145. Justice Lamar, joined by Justice Day, argued in 
dissent that the transported woman should be exempt from a conspiracy 
prosecution in all cases based on the legislative intent behind the Mann Act, 
which “treats the woman who is transported for use in the business of 
prostitution as a victim—often a willing victim, but nevertheless a victim . . . . 
[S]he cannot therefore be punished for being enslaved nor for consenting and 
agreeing to be transported by [the man] for purposes of such business. To hold 
otherwise, would make the law of conspiracy a sword with which to punish those 
whom the [Mann Act] was intended to protect.” Id. at 147–48 (Lamar, J., 
dissenting). The dissent added that, “if . . . Congress had intended that they 
should be subject to indictment for conspiracy, it would have so declared by 
extending the penal consequences of the prohibited act to all persons aiding, 
counseling, or encouraging the principal offender.” Id. at 150 (Lamar, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id. at 145.  
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The Court therefore saw no reason why a woman could not also 
be charged with conspiracy to violate the Act based on the 
preliminary agreement.31 To simplify, if the woman can in some 
circumstances be charged with a substantive Mann Act violation, 
why can’t she also be charged with conspiracy to violate the Act? 
The Court thus upheld the indictment, but did not opine about 
what facts would be required to support a conviction.32  
In Gebardi, the Court held, with Justice Stone writing for the 
majority, that although a woman can conspire to violate the 
Mann Act in some circumstances, as the Court held in Holte, 
evidence that a woman merely consented to being transported for 
the immoral purpose—and therefore did not commit a 
substantive violation—was insufficient to support a conspiracy 
conviction.33  
Critically, the Gebardi Court based its decision on 
congressional intent, which the Court divined from the text and 
legislative history of the Mann Act. The Court observed that 
“Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases which 
frequently, if not normally, involve consent and agreement on the 
part of the woman to the forbidden transportation,”34 and yet 
“this acquiescence, though an incident of a type of transportation 
specifically dealt with by the statute, was not made a crime under 
the Mann Act itself.”35 The Court thus perceived in the “failure of 
the Mann Act to condemn the woman’s participation in those 
transportations which are effected with her mere consent, 
evidence of an affirmative legislative policy to leave her 
acquiescence unpunished.”36 The Court noted that it was 
“concerned with something more than an agreement between two 
persons for one of them to commit an offense which the other 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (upholding the indictment). 
 33. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123. 
 34. Id. at 121. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 123 (emphasis added). 
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cannot commit”37—the situation in Ocasio. Indeed, the Court was 
concerned with “the added element that the offense planned, the 
criminal object of the conspiracy, involve[d] the agreement of the 
woman to her transportation by the man, which is the very 
conspiracy charged,”38 and which Congress contemplated would 
“frequently, if not normally” be the case, but chose not to 
criminalize.39 The Court rejected the view that “the very passage 
of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute 
of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers” upon a 
woman who merely consents to her illicit travel.40 The Court’s 
holdings in Holte and Gebardi, therefore, turned on congressional 
intent in enacting the Mann Act evidenced by the text and 
legislative history of the statute.41     
The Court in Ocasio sought to distill the teachings in these 
decisions, declaring:  
Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person 
may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive 
offense that he or she cannot personally commit. They 
also show that when that person’s consent or 
acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive 
offense, something more than bare consent or 
acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person 
was a conspirator.42  
The Court did not say, however, what that “something more” 
could be. In the Mann Act context, facts sufficient to support the 
conviction would have presumably involved the woman or girl 
playing an active role in bringing about her illegal 
transportation—rather than merely consenting to being 
transported—which could also support a substantive Mann Act 
                                                                                                     
 37.  Id. at 121; see also United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 144 (1915).  
 38.  Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121 (1932). 
 39.  Id.; see Holte, 236 U.S. at 144.  
 40.  Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.  
 41.  See id. at 121 (discussing what Congress “set out” to do in enacting the 
Mann Act); Holte, 236 U.S. at 144 (addressing the text of the Mann Act). 
 42.  Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (2016).  
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conviction. But the Court was silent as to what facts were 
required to support a Hobbs Act conviction in these 
circumstances. Trumpeting the principles in Holte and Gebardi 
as “longstanding principles of conspiracy law,”43 “age-old 
principles of conspiracy law,”44 and “basic principles of conspiracy 
law,”45 the Court concluded that “[t]hese basic principles of 
conspiracy law resolve this case.”46 
Based on Holte and Gebardi, the Ocasio Court held that, 
“[a]lthough [the shop owners] were incapable of committing the 
underlying substantive offense as principals, they could, under 
the reasoning of Holte and Gebardi, nevertheless conspire to 
commit Hobbs Act extortion by agreeing to help petitioner and 
other officers commit the substantive offense” of extorting 
themselves.47 The Court explained that,  
[i]n order to establish the existence of a conspiracy to 
violate the Hobbs Act, the Government has no obligation 
to demonstrate that each conspirator agreed personally 
to commit—or was even capable of committing—the 
substantive offense of Hobbs Act extortion. It is sufficient 
to prove that the conspirators agreed that the underlying 
crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy who 
was capable of committing it. In other words, each 
conspirator must have specifically intended that some 
conspirator commit each element of the substantive 
offense.48  
Based on the foregoing analysis, and without analyzing the 
Hobbs Act’s legislative intent or purpose—or whether Congress 
contemplated that the shop owners would “frequently, if not 
                                                                                                     
 43.  Id. at 1429. 
 44.  Id. at 1427. 
 45.  Id. at 1432.  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 48.  Id.  
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normally”49 agree to be extorted in typical cases—the Court 
upheld the police officer’s conspiracy conviction.50  
As noted above, the curious corollary of the Court’s holding is 
that a shop owner can conspire with a police officer to extort 
himself.51 This result requires further scrutiny.   
B. Did Ocasio Improperly Extend Holte and Gebardi? 
The Court in Ocasio arguably misinterpreted Holte and 
Gebardi by extracting from those cases “basic principles of 
conspiracy law” that were in fact tethered to Congress’s intent in 
enacting the Mann Act.52 As a result, the Court extended a 
holding specific to Mann Act conspiracy cases to a case involving 
conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act—a statute with different text, 
history, and legislative intent—thereby reaching the curious 
holding that a police officer can conspire with a shop owner to 
extort the shop owner.53 A more-careful application of Gebardi 
and its test, however, may have yielded a different result.  
At the outset, the Court in Ocasio may have 
mischaracterized the Holte and Gebardi decisions by suggesting 
that those cases involved defendants who were incapable of 
violating the Mann Act.54 In Holte and Gebardi, the Court made 
clear that a woman or girl could in some circumstances be 
charged with a substantive violation of the Mann Act for illegally 
transporting herself; thus, the cases did not turn on the principle 
that a “a conspiracy with an officer or employee of the 
                                                                                                     
 49.  Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932). 
 50.  See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1436 (upholding the petitioner’s conviction). 
 51.  See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (addressing this result of 
the Court’s decision). 
 52.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s use of 
intent- and text-based interpretation in Gebardi and Holte). 
 53.  See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (discussing Gebardi’s application to 
the facts of the case). 
 54.  See id. at 1432 (“Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person 
may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive offense that he or she 
cannot personally commit.”). 
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government or any other for an offense that only he could 
commit . . . fall[s] within the conspiracy section,” even though the 
Court in both cases noted this principle.55 Indeed, the Court in 
Holte explained that if the woman were the driving force in 
carrying out the Mann Act scheme—for example where she was a 
“professional prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was 
the man,” and she suggested and carried out the journey “in the 
hope of black-mailing the man,” including by buying railroad 
tickets for the illicit travel—the Court “s[aw] no reason why” the 
woman could not violate the Mann Act as a principal.56 
Nevertheless, the Court in Ocasio seemed to suggest that the 
Holte and Gebardi Courts “applied” the principle that a person 
incapable of committing the substantive offense can still be a 
conspirator.57 To the contrary, a careful reading of Holte and 
Gebardi reveals otherwise, even if the woman in Gebardi was 
incapable of committing the substantive offense based on the 
particular facts proven at trial.58 
Even more critically, the Court in Ocasio arguably 
misapplied the central principle of conspiracy law established by 
Gebardi when it ignored the Hobbs Act’s legislative intent in 
reaching its decision. In Gebardi, the Court looked to the text and 
                                                                                                     
 55.  United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915); see also Gebardi v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 120 (1932) (“Incapacity of one to commit the 
substantive offense does not necessarily imply that he may with impunity 
conspire with others who are able to commit it.”). 
 56.  Holte, 236 U.S. at 145. 
 57.  See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430 (“The Court applied these principles in 
two cases involving the Mann Act.”). The Court explained:  
Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person may be convicted of 
conspiring to commit a substantive offense that he or she cannot personally 
commit. They also show that when that person’s consent or acquiescence is 
inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare 
consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a 
conspirator. 
Id. at 1432 (emphasis added).  
 58.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical from 
Holte where a woman could be found to have committed a substantive Mann Act 
offense). 
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legislative history of the Mann Act to decide whether Congress 
intended that a woman who merely consented to the illicit 
transport—and thus did not violate the substantive provisions of 
the Mann Act—could be convicted of conspiracy to violate the 
Mann Act.59 As noted above, the Court explained: 
Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases 
which frequently, if not normally, involve consent and 
agreement on the part of the woman to the forbidden 
transportation. In every case in which she is not 
intimidated or forced into the transportation, the statute 
necessarily contemplates her acquiescence. Yet this 
acquiescence, though an incident of a type of 
transportation specifically dealt with by the statute, was 
not made a crime under the Mann Act itself . . . . We 
[rest our decision] rather upon the ground that we 
perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to condemn the 
woman’s participation in those transportations which are 
effected with her mere consent, evidence of an 
affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence 
unpunished. We think it a necessary implication of that 
policy that when the Mann Act and the conspiracy 
statute came to be construed together, as they 
necessarily would be, the same participation which the 
former contemplates as an inseparable incident of all 
cases in which the woman is a voluntary agent at all, but 
does not punish, was not automatically to be made 
punishable under the latter. It would contravene that 
policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act 
effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that 
immunity which the Mann Act itself confers.60 
In other words, the Gebardi principle holds that, when 
Congress enacts a criminal statute that “frequently, if not 
normally, involve[s] consent and agreement on the part of” a 
particular party, but does not punish that conduct, Congress does 
not intend to punish that same conduct under the general federal 
                                                                                                     
 59.  See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–23 (discussing Congress’s intent in 
enacting the Mann Act). 
 60.  Id. 
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conspiracy statute.61 In Gebardi, that meant that because 
Congress, in enacting the Mann Act, contemplated that the 
woman would frequently consent to the illicit travel, but did not 
elect to punish that conduct without more, Congress also did not 
intend to punish that conduct under the conspiracy statute.62 Yet 
if the woman in Gebardi had done more than merely consented to 
the travel and had, for instance, “aid[ed] or assist[ed]” in causing 
her illicit transportation, the woman would have violated the 
substantive provision of the Mann Act and could also have 
conspired to violate the Mann Act.63 Thus, the Gebardi Court 
required more than “mere consent” to convict the woman of 
conspiracy, presumably requiring conduct that would constitute a 
substantive Mann Act offense and that Congress therefore 
intended to punish under the Act.64 
The Gebardi principle, then, is perhaps best understood to 
mean that when the conduct of a particular class of actors (i.e., 
the transported woman) is “frequently, if not normally,” part of 
the conduct that a substantive criminal statute aims to punish, 
but the substantive statute leaves that class of actors’ conduct 
unpunished, then that same conduct should not give rise to 
conspiracy liability, because that was not Congress’s intent.65 In 
this way, the Gebardi principle, like Wharton’s Rule,66 is a rule of 
                                                                                                     
 61.  See id.  
 62.  See id. (“It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage 
of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that 
immunity which the Mann Act itself confers.”). 
 63.  See id. at 118–19 (noting that the Mann Act does not punish the 
woman for transporting herself).  
 64.  See id. at 123 (concluding that Congress did not intend to punish mere 
acquiescence to the transportation).  
 65.  See id. at 121–23 (discussing how the substantive offense under the 
Mann Act differs from conspiracy acts).  
 66.  See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785–86 (1975). The Court 
in Iannelli explained:)   
Wharton’s Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted 
criminal activity, a plurality of criminal agents. In such cases, a 
closer relationship exists between the conspiracy and the substantive 
offense because both require collective criminal activity. The 
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statutory construction intended to aid in determining legislative 
intent when defining the contours of conspiracy liability.67 The 
Ocasio Court’s interpretation of the general federal conspiracy 
statute, detached from the text and legislative intent of the 
predicate substantive offense, by contrast, can lead to a holding 
that frustrates congressional intent.68 To be sure, the general 
federal conspiracy statute aims to punish a separate offense than 
the charged predicate offense; but Gebardi suggests that in some 
cases courts should nevertheless consider whether Congress’s 
intent to leave unpunished certain conduct under a substantive 
criminal statute means that Congress also meant to leave that 
conduct unpunished under the conspiracy statute.       
The Ocasio Court thus misapplied the Gebardi principle 
when it extended the Mann Act–specific holding from Gebardi to 
the Hobbs Act, instead of focusing on whether Congress aimed to 
punish the extorted shop owners under the conspiracy statute 
when it passed the Hobbs Act.69 As Justice Sotomayor observed in 
her dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, the majority in 
Ocasio “stretches this Mann Act case beyond its tethers,” and 
                                                                                                     
substantive offense therefore presents some of the same threats that 
the law of conspiracy normally is thought to guard against, and it 
cannot automatically be assumed that the Legislature intended the 
conspiracy and the substantive offense to remain as discrete crimes 
upon consummation of the latter. Thus, absent legislative intent to 
the contrary, the Rule supports a presumption that the two merge 
when the substantive offense is proved . . . . [A]s the Rule is 
essentially an aid to the determination of legislative intent, it must 
defer to a discernible legislative judgment.  
 
 67.  See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123 (finding an affirmative legislative intent 
in the Mann Act to leave the woman’s mere acquiescence to the illicit transport 
unpunished). 
 68.  See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (noting that the 
Supreme Court resolved Ocasio on general principles of conspiracy law).  
 69.  See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1431 n.4 (describing the Gebardi reasoning 
and conclusion). The Court in Ocasio downplayed the significance of the Mann 
Act’s text in the Gebardi decision, reducing Gebardi’s discussion of the Mann 
Act’s “affirmative legislative policy” to a footnote, and characterizing it as 
merely part of the “path of reasoning by which the Gebardi Court reached [its] 
conclusions.” Id.  
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most of the “so-called” “age-old principles of conspiracy law” 
relied upon by the majority “are derived from decisions that turn 
on interpreting the text of another federal statute—the Mann 
Act.”70  
For the Ocasio Court to have properly applied the principle 
in Gebardi, then—and putting aside the distinction that the shop 
owner, unlike the woman in Gebardi, could not commit the 
substantive Hobbs Act offense in Ocasio—the Court would have 
needed to determine: (1) whether Congress, in enacting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a) and (b)(2) of the Hobbs Act, set out to deal with cases 
that “frequently, if not normally, involve[d] consent and 
agreement on the part of” an extorted party71 (here, a party from 
whom someone has obtained property “with his consent . . . under 
color of official right.”72); and, if so, (2) whether those sections of 
the Hobbs Act punish the extorted party’s conduct.73 If Congress 
enacted the Hobbs Act provision to deal with situations that 
frequently, if not normally, involve parties who are extorted with 
consent under color of official right, but did not punish the 
extorted party’s conduct, then the Court should have perceived in 
Congress’s “failure to condemn” the shop owner for his conduct 
“an affirmative legislative policy to leave [the shop owner] 
unpunished” for both the extortion and his agreement to being 
extorted.74 But if Congress elected to punish that conduct as a 
substantive offense, then the Court should sustain a conspiracy 
charge predicated on that conduct.75  
If the Court had undertaken this analysis, it may have 
concluded that the Hobbs Act provisions at issue—which 
                                                                                                     
 70.  Id. at 1443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also dissented, 
but on the distinct ground that the Court should have overruled an earlier 
decision relied upon by the majority, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 
(1992), which equated Hobbs Act extortion with bribery. Id. at 1437 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); see also Stith, supra note 11, at 237–39.  
 71.  Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121. 
 72.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).  
 73.  See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See id.  
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proscribe extortion involving “the obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent . . . under color of official right”—
contemplated that frequently the extorted persons will not only 
have consented but also agreed to the scheme.76 If the Court 
reached this conclusion, Gebardi would require the Court to hold 
that the shop owner could not conspire to extort himself because 
the Hobbs Act meant to leave unpunished his agreement to being 
extorted.77 This principle would not leave unpunished, however, 
an agreement by a third party incapable of committing the 
substantive Hobbs Act violation but whose consent is not 
frequently or normally involved, such as someone who identified 
the shop owner as an extortion target for the police officers or 
otherwise facilitated the scheme. 
Having highlighted the arguable weaknesses in the Supreme 
Court’s Ocasio decision, and its arguable misapplication of Holte 
and Gebardi, this Article now turns to the question of how 
Ocasio’s holding and interpretation of Holte and Gebardi could 
expand the reach of the general federal conspiracy statute to 
include bribe-taking foreign officials within its scope, despite the 
Fifth Circuit’s oft-cited holding to the contrary in United States v. 
Castle.78 
III. Corrupt Foreign Officials, Beware: Ocasio’s Potential 
Impact on United States v. Castle and the Scope of 
FCPA Conspiracy Liability 
Setting aside the Ocasio decision’s arguable infirmities, this 
Article considers the Ocasio decision’s potential impact on a 
                                                                                                     
 76.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion to mean “the obtaining of 
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear or under color of official right”). 
 77.  See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123 (holding that the woman’s consent did not 
support her Mann Act conspiracy conviction).   
 78.  925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
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specific area of conspiracy law long thought to have been settled: 
foreign-official conspiracy liability under the FCPA.79  
A. United States v. Castle 
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit decided the seminal case of United 
States v. Castle,80 holding that the Government cannot charge 
bribe-taking foreign officials—who cannot as principals violate 
the substantive provisions of the FCPA, which targets 
bribe-payers—with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions.81 The Court in Castle concluded that, in enacting the 
FCPA, “Congress affirmatively chose to exempt this small class of 
persons from prosecution,” extending the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Gebardi v. United States.82  
In Castle, federal prosecutors in Texas charged Canadian 
“foreign officials” Donald Castle and Darrell W.T. Lowry with 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA.83 According to the indictment, 
John Blondek and Vernon Tull, two U.S. citizens and employees 
of Eagle Bus Company, a U.S. concern, paid Castle and Lowry a 
bribe of $50,000 to secure a contract to provide buses to the 
Saskatchewan provincial government.84 The Canadian officials 
moved to dismiss the indictment, which the district court 
granted, relying on Gebardi.85  
                                                                                                     
 79.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. 
(2012). 
 80.  925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 81.  See id. at 836 (noting an affirmative legislative policy to leave this 
group unpunished).    
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See id. at 832 (noting that Castle and Lowry moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the grounds that, as foreign officials, they could not be convicted 
of the offense). 
 84.  See id. (describing the allegations in the indictment). 
 85.  See United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), aff’d 
sub nom. Castle, 925 F.2d at 832 (holding that bribe-taking foreign officials 
could not be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA in accordance with 
Gebardi).  
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, adopting the opinion of 
the district court nearly in its entirety. At the outset, the Fifth 
Circuit observed that:  
There is no question that the payment of the bribe by 
Defendants Blondek and Tull is illegal under the FCPA 
and that they may be prosecuted for conspiring to violate 
the Act. Nor is it disputed that Defendants Castle and 
Lowry could not be charged with violating the FCPA 
itself, since the Act does not criminalize the receipt of a 
bribe by a foreign official.86 
The Court continued: “[t]he issue here is whether the 
Government may prosecute [Canadian foreign officials] Castle 
and Lowry under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
for conspiring to violate the FCPA.”87 It cannot, the Fifth Circuit 
held.88 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit extended 
Gebardi’s rationale to foreign officials charged with conspiracy to 
violate the FCPA. The Court explained: 
The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Gebardi squarely applies to the case before this Court. 
Congress intended in both the FCPA and the Mann Act 
to deter and punish certain activities which necessarily 
involved the agreement of at least two people, but 
Congress chose in both statutes to punish only one party 
to the agreement. In Gebardi the Supreme Court refused 
to disregard Congress’ intention to exempt one party by 
allowing the Executive to prosecute that party under the 
general conspiracy statute for precisely the same 
conduct. Congress made the same choice in drafting the 
FCPA, and by the same analysis, this Court may not 
allow the Executive to override the Congressional intent 
not to prosecute foreign officials for their participation in 
the prohibited acts.89 
                                                                                                     
 86.  Castle, 925 F.2d at 832.  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  See id. at 836.  
 89.  Id. at 833.  
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The Court highlighted what it viewed as “overwhelming evidence 
of a Congressional intent to exempt foreign officials from 
prosecution for receiving bribes, especially since Congress knew it 
had the power to reach foreign officials in many cases, and yet 
declined to exercise that power.”90 The Court added, “[a]s in 
Gebardi, it would be absurd to take away with the earlier and 
more general conspiracy statute the exemption from prosecution 
granted to foreign officials by the later and more specific FCPA.”91 
Thus, the Court properly focused on legislative intent behind the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castle is not beyond reproach. 
For example, the Court’s characterization of the Mann Act and 
the FCPA as prohibiting “activities which necessarily involved 
the agreement of at least two people”92 was doubly incorrect. In 
Gebardi, the Supreme Court made clear that “criminal 
transportation under the Mann Act may be effected without the 
woman’s consent as in cases of intimidation or force,” such that 
the principle known as Wharton’s Rule did not apply.93 Similarly, 
a principal can violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions without 
the agreement of a foreign official, for instance when a principal 
offers a foreign official a bribe but the official declines to accept 
it.94   
                                                                                                     
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 836.  
 92.  Id. at 833 (emphasis added).  
 93.  Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 122 (1932) (emphasis added); 
see supra notes 26 & 66 and accompanying text (discussing Wharton’s Rule and 
the Gebardi Court’s explanation of the same).  
 94.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (prohibiting issuers, domestic concerns, and 
other persons from using bribery to influence foreign officials, foreign political 
parties, and foreign candidates in order to obtain or retain business). The Fifth 
Circuit may have meant that a violation of both the Mann Act and the FCPA 
required the involvement of two parties—not the agreement or concurrence of 
two parties. See, e.g., Castle, 925 F.2d at 833 n.1 (“In the Mann Act the two 
necessary parties were the transporter and the transported woman, and in the 
FCPA the necessary parties were the U.S. company paying the bribe and the 
foreign official accepting it.”). The mere involvement of two parties in a violation 
of the statute, moreover, would not trigger Wharton’s Rule absent the required 
element that they entered into the agreement. See supra notes 26 & 66 and 
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Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit’s application of Gebardi in 
Castle was probably correct. Congress enacted the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA knowing that the proscribed conduct 
frequently if not normally involved acceptance of bribes by 
corrupt foreign officials, but did not condemn the foreign official’s 
conduct under the statute. Thus, Congress probably did not 
intend to create conspiracy liability for those foreign officials 
when enacting the FCPA. That said, the Fifth Circuit may have 
overstated the strength of this argument when it noted that 
“evidence of a Congressional intent to exempt foreign officials 
from prosecution for receiving bribes” was “overwhelming.”95 
Indeed, the Government highlighted in its appellate brief in 
Castle that the House Report relating to the FCPA’s passage 
stated that “[t]he concepts of aiding and abetting and joint 
participation would apply to a violation under this bill in the 
same manner in which those concepts have always applied in 
both SEC civil actions and implied private actions brought under 
the securities laws generally.”96 Small wonder, then, that the 
Government thought the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castle was 
“patently incorrect.”97 On the other hand, the House Report may 
not have had in mind bribe-taking foreign officials, as opposed to 
bribe-payers who conspire with each other to pay bribes to those 
officials.98  
Castle’s holding has had a widespread impact. Indeed, Castle 
is the only appellate decision to have decided the question of 
                                                                                                     
accompanying text (discussing Wharton’s Rule). 
 95.  See Castle, 925 F.2d at 833 (arguing that there was intent to exempt 
foreign officials from the FCPA “since Congress knew it had the power to reach 
foreign officials in many cases, and yet declined to exercise that power”). 
 96.  See Brief for the United States at *21, United States v. Castle, 925 
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1455), 1990 WL 10085129 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
95-640, at 8 (1977) (analyzing Section 2 of the Unlawful Corporate Payments 
Act of 1977)) (emphasis added).  
 97.  See id. at *13 (arguing that the lower court misread and misapplied 
Gebardi). 
 98.  For a comprehensive and fascinating look at the enactment of the 
FCPA, see Michael Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 
OHIO ST. L. J. 929 (2012).  
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whether a bribe-taking foreign official can conspire to violate the 
FCPA, and the Government has fully accepted its holding. In the 
decades since Castle, the Government has not prosecuted any 
alleged bribe-taking foreign officials for conspiracy to violate the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. And the Department of Justice 
itself has explained, in its FCPA Guidance released in 2012, that 
bribe-taking foreign officials are not liable under the general 
federal conspiracy statute for conspiracy to violate the FCPA.99  
But the Ocasio100 decision calls all that into question.  
B. Is Castle still good law? 
The Ocasio decision seems to undermine the Castle decision 
and suggest that the Government can charge bribe-taking foreign 
officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions, so long as the bribe-taking foreign officials do more 
than merely consent to the bribery scheme.  
Ocasio makes clear that, “[n]ot only is it unnecessary for each 
member of a conspiracy to agree to commit each element of the 
substantive offense, but also a conspirator may be convicted even 
though he was incapable of committing the substantive offense 
himself.”101 The Court in Ocasio further held that, based on Holte 
and Gebardi, “when that person’s consent or acquiescence is 
inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more 
than bare consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that 
the person was a conspirator.”102 Based on these principles, the 
Court in Ocasio concluded that “[a]lthough [the shop owners] 
                                                                                                     
 99.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE 
GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 48–49 (2012) (citing Castle 
and stating that, “although foreign officials cannot be prosecuted for FCPA 
violations,” certain foreign officials have been prosecuted for money laundering). 
 100.  See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016) (upholding 
conviction of a police officer for extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion 
under the Hobbs Act). 
 101.  Id. at 1430 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 102.  Id. at 1432.  
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were incapable of committing the underlying substantive offense 
as principals, they could, under the reasoning of Holte and 
Gebardi, conspire to commit Hobbs Act extortion by agreeing to 
help petitioner and other officers commit the substantive 
offense.”103  
Applying the foregoing reasoning in the FCPA context, a 
foreign official arguably can be charged with conspiring to violate 
the FCPA—at least where the bribe-taking foreign official has 
done more than merely consented or acquiesced to accepting the 
illicit bribe.  
First, although a bribe-taking foreign official cannot violate 
the FCPA as a principal—because the FCPA generally proscribes 
the payment or offering of payment of bribes to foreign officials in 
order to obtain or retain business—that prohibition does not 
mean that a bribe-taking foreign official cannot conspire with a 
principal to violate the FCPA.104 The Holte-Gebardi-Ocasio trio of 
cases make clear that incapacity to commit the object of the 
conspiracy, as a principal, does not bar a conspiracy count, which 
charges a distinct offense.105   
Second—although discussed only in Holte and Gebardi, and 
not in Ocasio—Wharton’s Rule likely does not preclude charges 
against a bribe-taking foreign official for conspiracy to violate the 
FCPA. Just like under the Mann Act, where the Supreme Court 
in Holte and Gebardi pointed out that the Act could be violated by 
a principal without the consent or acquiescence of a woman, 
warranting no Wharton’s Rule exception, a principal can violate 
the FCPA without the consent or acquiescence of a foreign 
official. For instance, a principal can violate the FCPA by using 
the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly to 
offer to pay a bribe to a foreign official in order to retain or obtain 
                                                                                                     
 103.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 104.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (prohibiting issuers, domestic concerns, and 
other persons from using bribery to influence foreign officials, foreign political 
parties, and foreign candidates in order to obtain or retain business).  
 105.  See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430; Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 
120–21 (1932); United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915).  
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business, where the official declines to accept the bribe.106 Or a 
foreign official could hypothetically ask a principal to offer him a 
bribe in violation of the FCPA, only to later decline to accept the 
bribe due to a change of heart, or because he has selected a more 
lucrative or otherwise-attractive offer from another bribe-payer 
instead. Accordingly, Wharton’s Rule’s narrow application “to 
offenses that require concerted criminal activity, a plurality of 
criminal agents,”107 should not apply in the FCPA context.108 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s key conclusion in Ocasio that 
when the “consent or acquiescence” of a person incapable of 
acting as a principal “is inherent in the underlying substantive 
                                                                                                     
 106.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).  
 107.  See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975) (limiting 
Wharton’s Rule’s application to only those offenses). 
 108.  Moreover, a conspiracy to violate the FCPA entered into by a principal 
and a bribe-taking foreign official raises concerns not found in the narrow 
subset of cases to which Wharton’s Rule has traditionally applied. The Supreme 
Court explained in Iannelli that “[t]he classic Wharton’s Rule offenses—
adultery, incest, bigamy, dueling—are crimes that are characterized by the 
general congruence of the agreement and the substantive offense, and the 
immediate consequences of the crime rest on the parties themselves rather than 
on society at large.” Id. at 782–83 (emphasis added). Also, the conspiratorial 
agreement in Wharton’s Rule cases tends to be unlikely “to pose the distinct 
kinds of threats to society that the law of conspiracy seeks to avert,” for instance 
where “an agreement to commit an offense . . . will produce agreements to 
engage in a more general pattern of criminal conduct.” Id. at 783; see also 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (explaining that conspiracy 
is “an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to 
the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crimes,” involving 
“deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the 
conspiracies for further and habitual criminal practices,” and “characterized by 
secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, 
and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered” (quoting United 
States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915))). A conspiracy to violate the FCPA 
between a bribe-paying principal and a foreign official, in contrast, results in 
harm to those beyond “the parties themselves,” Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 782–83, due 
to the misappropriation of public funds or corruption of the foreign official’s 
decision. Cf. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1215 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that Wharton’s Rule’s does not apply to a conviction for conspiracy to 
commit bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201 and under § 666 in part because “bribery 
is not limited to the bribe-payor and recipient, as the crime involves public 
corruption, which harms society at as a whole”).  
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offense, something more than bare consent or acquiescence may 
be needed to prove that the person was a conspirator,” seems to 
support the view that a bribe-taking foreign official can in some 
circumstances be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.109 
The Ocasio Court did not, as one of the dissents pointed out, 
indicate when mere consent tips over into a conspiracy.110 But 
several circumstances would likely suffice in the FCPA context.  
Consider, for example, a scenario in which a senior official at 
a foreign state-owned entity (“SOE”) in charge of contracting 
informs a business executive that the official will be drafting a 
request for proposal (“RFP”) for a lucrative contract. The foreign 
official demands a bribe from the business executive, and 
promises that in exchange for the bribe, the foreign official will 
draft the RFP in a way that will guarantee that the SOE awards 
the contract to the business executive’s company. The foreign 
official threatens, however, that if the business executive does not 
pay the bribe, his company will not win the contract and will also 
be frozen out of all future RFPs issued by the SOE. The business 
executive is at first reluctant to pay the bribe due to ethical and 
legal concerns and his fear of being detected by the company’s 
compliance department or, worse yet, by law-enforcement 
officials. But after further prodding and pressure by the foreign 
official, the business executive worries that he will jeopardize his 
company’s ability to work with the SOE in the future if he does 
not pay the bribe and may even lose his job. As a result, the 
business executive pays the foreign official the demanded bribe, 
and his company wins the contract. Consistent with Ocasio, has 
the foreign official conspired to violate the FCPA?  
In the foregoing example, the bribe-taking foreign official has 
not merely consented to or acquiesced to the illegal bribe.  
Rather, the foreign official is a “but for” cause of the principal’s 
ultimate decision to violate the FCPA. If federal prosecutors were 
to charge the foreign official in this scenario, they would have a 
                                                                                                     
 109.  Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432.  
 110.  See id. at 1445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the ambiguity in the 
Ocasio majority opinion about when “mere ‘consent’ tip[s] over into conspiracy”). 
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colorable argument that the charges are consistent with the 
“basic principles of conspiracy law” summarized in Ocasio and 
articulated in Holte and Gebardi.111   
The possibility that the Government could charge 
bribe-taking foreign officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA 
is not merely academic. Since 2009, the Department of Justice’s 
charging decisions in cases involving foreign bribery have evinced 
a steadfast commitment to prosecuting bribe-taking foreign 
officials, who compose the “demand side” of the foreign-bribery 
equation and are thought by some to be a root cause of foreign 
bribery.112 At the time this Article went to press, beginning with 
the indictment of “foreign officials” Juthamas and Jittisopa 
Siriwan on substantive and conspiracy money-laundering 
charges, federal prosecutors have charged at least eleven “foreign 
officials” with violations relating to various bribery schemes, 
despite the Government’s view that these officials cannot be 
charged with FCPA conspiracy in light of Castle.113 In particular, 
                                                                                                     
 111.  Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Ocasio suggests certain factors that 
could be relevant in determining when consent has tipped over into conspiracy:  
When does mere ‘consent’ tip over into conspiracy? Does it depend on 
whose idea it was? Whether the bribe was floated as an ‘official 
demand’ or a suggestion? How happy the citizen is to pay off the 
public official? How much money is involved? Whether the citizen 
gained a benefit (a liquor license) or avoided a loss (closing the 
restaurant)? How many times the citizen paid the bribes? Whether he 
ever resisted paying or called the police? 
 Id. 
 112.  See, e.g., Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 
NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 781, 795–800 (2011) (describing the nature and frequency 
of bribe demands by foreign officials). See generally Lucinda Low, The “Demand 
Side” of Transnational Bribery & Corruption: Why Leveling the Playing Field on 
the Supply Side Isn’t Enough, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (2015); Lindsay B. 
Arrieta, Attacking Bribery at Its Core: Shifting Focus to the Demand Side of the 
Bribery Equation, 45 PUB. CONT. L. J. 587 (2016). 
 113.  See Indictment, United States v. Siriwan, 2009 WL 10667404 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2009) (Juthamas and Jittisopa Siriwan); Judgment and 
Probation/Commitment Order for Defendant Gerald Green, United States v. 
Green, No. 2:08-cr-00059-GW (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010), ECF No. 385 (Gerald 
Green); Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order for Defendant Patricia 
Toledo Green, United States v. Green, No. 2:08-cr-00059-GW (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 
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2010), ECF No. 387 (Patricia Green); Film Executive and Spouse Found Guilty 
of Paying Bribes to a Senior Thai Tourism Official to Obtain Lucrative 
Contracts, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 14, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/film-
executive-and-spouse-found-guilty-paying-bribes-senior-thai-tourism-official-
obtain (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Two Florida Executives, One Florida Intermediary and Two Former 
Haitian Government Officials Indicted for Their Alleged Participation in Foreign 
Bribery Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-florida-executives-one-florida-intermediary-
and-two-former-haitian-government-officials (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) 
(reporting on Robert Antoine and Jean Rene Duperval) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for 
Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in 
Haiti, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 25, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-
sentenced-15-years-prison-scheme-bribe-officials-state-owned-
telecommunications (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (mentioning Patrick Joseph in 
allegations of a scheme to commit bribery) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); High-Ranking Bank Official at Venezuelan State Development 
Bank Pleads Guilty to Participating in Bribery Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 
18, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/high-ranking-bank-official-venezuelan-
state-development-bank-pleads-guilty-participating (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) 
(discussing Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez de Hernandez, former bank official of 
Venezuela’s economic development bank) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Nuclear Energy Official Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering 
Conspiracy Involving Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-nuclear-energy-
official-pleads-guilty-money-laundering-conspiracy-involving (last visited Nov. 
1, 2017) (reporting on Vadim Mikerin) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Miami Businessman Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Fraud 
Charges in Connection with Venezuela Bribery Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 
23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/miami-businessman-pleads-guilty-
foreign-bribery-and-fraud-charges-connection-venezuela (last visited Nov. 1, 
2017) (discussing Jose Luis Ramos Castillo, Christian Javier Maldonado 
Barillas, and Alfonzo Eliezer Gravina Munoz) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Former Guinean Minister of Mines Convicted of Receiving 
and Laundering $8.5 Million in Bribes from China International Fund and 
China Sonangol (May 4, 2017),  https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-guinean-
minister-mines-convicted-receiving-and-laundering-85-million-bribes-china (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2017) (discussing Mahmoud Thiam, a former minister of the 
Republic of Guinea) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also 
Director of South Korea's Earthquake Research Center Convicted of Money 
Laundering in Million Dollar Bribe Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/director-south-koreas-earthquake-research-
center-convicted-money-laundering-million-dollar (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) 
(“For the second time in recent months, the Criminal Division has convicted a 
foreign official, [Heon-Cheol Chi], who solicited bribes and then laundered the 
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federal prosecutors have successfully used the money-laundering 
statute and the Travel Act, often in conjunction with the general 
federal conspiracy statute, to prosecute bribe-taking foreign 
officials in cases that involve FCPA charges against the 
bribe-payers. These prosecutions, spanning 2009 to present, 
appear to be part of the Government’s broader strategy of 
targeting the “demand side” of foreign bribery.114 
                                                                                                     
illicit proceeds in the United States. We will continue to hold such individuals 
responsible and accountable.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). For further reading on this subject, see Michael Dearington, The 
Challenges of Pursuing Foreign Bribe-Takers, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-challenges-of-pursuing-foreign-bribe-takers/ (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law review); 
Michael Dearington, From Siriwan to Gonzalez: Why the DOJ Altered The Way 
it Charges Alleged Corrupt Foreign Officials, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/from-siriwan-to-gonzalez-why-the-doj-altered-the-way-
it-charges-alleged-corrupt-foreign-officials/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law review).  
 114.  The indictments brought in the Haiti Teleco case roughly coincided 
with the Department of Justice’s launch of the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery 
Initiative, in July 2010, which Attorney General Holder indicated was “aimed at 
combating large-scale foreign official corruption and recovering public funds for 
their intended—and proper—use: for the people of our nations.” Attorney 
General Holder at the African Union Summit, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 25, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-african-union-
summit (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Attorney General Holder indicated that the Department of Justice is 
“assembling a team of prosecutors who will focus exclusively on this work and 
build upon efforts already underway to deter corruption, hold offenders 
accountable, and protect public resources.” Id. Assistant Attorney General for 
the Criminal Division Leslie Caldwell echoed this sentiment, remarking in 
November 2014, “now we also are prosecuting the bribe takers, using our money 
laundering and other laws . . . . Our efforts to hold bribe takers as well as bribe 
payors accountable for their criminal conduct are greatly aided by out foreign 
partners.” Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Speaks at American 
Conference Institute’s 31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-
speaks-american-conference-institute-s-31st (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Congress has joined in the effort to 
deter and punish bribe-taking foreign officials, suggesting broad-based support 
for an expansive enforcement approach. For instance, Congress recently enacted 
the “Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act,” § 3 of which permits 
the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person who, inter alia, “is a 
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If the Government decides to challenge Castle, it will likely 
wait for a test case involving facts similar to the example above—
where a zealous and aggressive foreign official was a “but for” 
cause of the bribery scheme, and did not merely consent to the 
scheme by accepting the bribes.115 In the meantime, however, the 
Government will likely continue to prosecute bribe-taking foreign 
officials, where appropriate, under the Money Laundering 
Control Act or the Travel Act. And courts will continue to grapple 
                                                                                                     
government official, or a senior associate of such an official, that is responsible 
for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of 
significant corruption, including the expropriation of private or public assets for 
personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of 
natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of 
corruption to foreign jurisdictions . . . .” Pub. L. No. 114–328, § 1263(a)(3), 130 
Stat. 1999, 2534 (2016). For a detailed personal narrative of the events that led 
to passage of the Act, see BILL BROWDER, RED NOTICE: A TRUE STORY OF HIGH 
FINANCE, MURDER, AND ONE MAN’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (Simon & Schuster 2015).  
 115.  A case involving the question of whether a nonresident foreign 
national can be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA was pending before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit when this Article went to press. 
In United States v. Hoskins, just months before the Supreme Court handed 
down the Ocasio decision, a federal district court in the District of Connecticut 
held that defendant Lawrence Hoskins—a nonresident foreign national charged 
with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, substantive violations of the FCPA and 
aiding and abetting the same, and money laundering and aiding and abetting 
the same, all in connection with the Alstom bribery case—could not be held 
criminally liable for conspiring to violate or aiding and abetting an FCPA 
violation. No. 3:12-cr-238 (JBA), 2016 WL 1069645, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 
2016) (providing the District Court’s discussion and analysis of the legal issue). 
The District Court observed, based on the text, structure, and legislative history 
of the FCPA, that Congress had intended to exclude nonresident foreign 
nationals from liability under Sections 78dd-3 and 78dd-2 of the FCPA unless 
they acted while in the United States or acted as an agent of a domestic concern, 
respectively. See id. at *2 (explaining the District Court’s prevailing 
interpretation of the statute). Extending the Gebardi principle, the District 
Court therefore concluded that a nonresident foreign national can only be 
charged with conspiring to violate or aiding and abetting a violation of Section 
78dd-2, at issue in the case, if he was conspiring or aiding and abetting as an 
agent of a domestic concern. See id. at *6 (rejecting the Government’s 
alternative interpretation of the FCPA). Although not squarely on point, this 
case could present an opportunity for the Second Circuit to examine Ocasio’s 
impact in the context of a different but related FCPA conspiracy case.   
OCASIO V. UNITED STATES 233 
 
 
with how to interpret the scope of the general federal conspiracy 
statute, whose bounds remain unclear. 
